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The California recall election of 2003 provides an excellent setting in which to investigate voter rationality and cer-
tain forms of sophisticated voting. In a pre-election telephone survey, 1500 registered voters were asked to make 
pairwise comparisons between the major candidates, and responses to these questions were combined to infer prefe-
rences. Individuals’ preference orderings over the major candidates rarely exhibited intransitivity. The patterns of 
tactical voting observed in the replacement part of the recall election were consistent with the declining rate hypo-
thesis, which holds that more support for minor candidates translates into smaller losses due to defection. Voters 
also engaged in another form of sophisticated voting, which we call hedge voting, on the recall question itself. The 
results of our analyses, as well as other considerations, lead us to characterize voters’ decisions as ‘rationalistic’: 
while voters are extremely consistent in forming utility-based preference rankings and choosing on the basis of these 
rankings, the voting strategies they adopt do not incorporate probability assessments in a realistic, consistent fa-
shion, and may not involve probability assessments at all. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
On 7 October 2003, the voters of California recalled Governor Gray Davis and elected Arnold 
Schwarzenegger to replace him. This election provides an excellent setting for the investigation 
of basic propositions, derived from rational choice theory, concerning voters’ preferences and 
various forms of sophisticated voting. In the ten days preceding the recall election we collected 
survey data from 1500 registered California voters in order to test these propositions.  Details 
concerning the administration of this survey are reported in the Appendix.  
Part I of our study investigates how closely individual preference orderings conform to 
the basic tenets of rationality. Whatever else it might mean to be rational, rationality requires that 
preference orderings be transitive. Voters whose preferences are not transitive essentially have 
voting cycles in their heads, and we cannot establish a rational basis for their choices. Social 
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choice theory has established that social orderings do not recapitulate the transitivity that is as-
sumed to characterize the preference orderings of rational individuals. If this assumption is in 
turn problematic, and many voters do have intransitive preferences, the problems confronted by 
social choice theory may be even more intractable.   
In undertaking this investigation, it was critical that we identify preference orderings as 
accurately as possible. Survey research has relied heavily upon ‘feeling thermometers’ to infer 
voters’ preferences, but these measures are problematic in several ways. We therefore employed 
a different method for eliciting preferences. Respondents were asked to make a series of pairwise 
choices involving the four major candidates in the election, and preference orderings were in-
ferred by combining their answers. This method yielded extremely accurate assessments of pre-
ference orderings.  
Given the importance of preference transitivity to the rational choice approach, it is re-
markable that previous research on the empirical status of transitivity is limited to a couple of 
studies published many years ago. These studies, by Brady and Ansolabehere1 and by Radcliff 2,  
report that few voters in the samples they analyzed exhibited intransitive preference orderings. 
Our findings concerning California recall voters were similar but even more striking, as we ob-
served an even lower incidence of intransitivity than had these two previous studies.  
In the weeks leading up to Election Day, there was considerable concern that the winner 
of the election might not be a Condorcet winner, i.e., the winner of pairwise contests against all 
other candidates.  This concern was due, in part, to the unusual structure of the ballot, which re-
quired voters to make two separate choices: 1) to recall Gray Davis or not, and 2) to select a re-
placement for him. The plurality winner of the replacement election would become governor on-
ly if a majority voted in favor of recalling Davis. Davis himself could not be a candidate in the 
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replacement election.3  Some speculated that Davis might be the Condorcet winner, but would 
not muster a majority against his recall.  Another possibility was that with 135 candidates run-
ning in the replacement election, the plurality winner of this contest might well fail to satisfy the 
Condorcet criterion. Our survey data shows that Schwarzenegger was in fact preferred to all oth-
er major candidates, and was thus the Condorcet winner. 
In Part II of our study we employ the data on preference orderings generated in Part I to 
investigate the choices that voters made in the second, replacement part of the election. Since 
publication of Farquharson’s seminal work, scholars working from a rational choice perspective 
have focused on what he termed ‘sophisticated’ voting.4  The most common manifestation of 
voter sophistication is tactical voting (otherwise known as strategic voting), which occurs in mul-
ti-candidate, plurality rule elections when voters believe that their most preferred candidate does 
not have a realistic chance of winning. So as to not ‘waste their vote,’ they opt instead for a less 
preferred (but more competitive and still acceptable) candidate in order to counter an even lesser 
preferred candidate.5  In a three-candidate setting this decision can be expressed in expected 
utility terms as 
EU(V1) – EU(V2) = p1(u1 – u3) – p2(u2 – u3) 
where V1 is a vote for one’s first choice, V2 a vote for one’s second choice, the u terms the utili-
ties derived from each of the three candidates in order of preference, and the p terms the proba-
bilities of casting the pivotal vote that would bring about their victory.6 Voters vote tactically for 
their second choice when this expression is negative, i.e., EU(V2) > EU(V1).   
As rational choice theorists and their critics have long noted, there is an inconvenient 
truth that must be confronted here. In elections involving millions of voters, even extremely 
close elections, the probability of casting the pivotal vote that decides the outcome of the election 
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is effectively zero.7  The standard rational choice model of tactical voting thus requires that vot-
ers harbor the illusion of possibly being pivotal, which hardly seems consistent with a theory that 
purports to be based upon principles of rationality. Turning out to vote can be reconciled with 
expected utility calculations by adding a D > 0 consumption term,8 but this is just another way of 
saying that voters vote because, for one reason or another, they enjoy doing so. The zero likelih-
ood of being pivotal has led some to argue that it makes no sense to cast a tactical vote,9 but it is 
also the case that not casting a tactical vote has the same, utterly inconsequential impact on the 
outcome of a large-scale election.  
Our study, however, is concerned with determining empirically what real voters actually 
do, and not with the controversy as to what a rational voter should or should not do. What we 
already know from a vast amount of previous research is that voters do cast tactical votes. Alva-
rez and Nagler list ten studies that detect tactical voting in British parliamentary elections, in ad-
dition to their own. 10  Dozens of other studies also document tactical voting in US presidential 
primaries and presidential contests with third-party candidates.11  As indicated above, however, 
the decision to vote for a lesser preferred candidate is apparently based upon a contingency, i.e. 
being pivotal, that has no likelihood of ever occurring. So what do we make of this?  
For now, we think it is best to characterize tactical voters as ‘rationalistic’: while they 
may have well-behaved preference orderings and make choices that are logically consistent with 
these orderings, they make the choice to vote for lesser preferred candidates as if they were (or 
might reasonably expect to be) the pivotal voter, even though the laws of probability make this 
an impossibility. The results of the analyses reported in this paper provide additional evidence 
that voters’ choices do not incorporate probability assessments in a realistic, consistent fashion. 
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This lead us to suspect that that the key element of our definition of what it means to be rationa-
listic is the ‘as if’ phrase, and that voters’ choices may not involve probability assessments at all. 
While much evidence confirms the existence of tactical voting, we clearly need to learn 
more about how the interaction between preferences and candidates’ standings plays out in vot-
ers’ minds. How poorly must a candidate be doing before supporters conclude that voting for 
him or her is tantamount to throwing away their vote?  According to Palfrey’s theoretical treat-
ment of Duverger’s law, the probability of being pivotal is positive only when one votes for one 
of the top two candidates, and so candidates other than the top two should receive no votes what-
soever.12  Given that the probability of being pivotal in a large electorate is effectively zero no 
matter what a voter does, a more realistic variation on this reasoning holds that votes received by 
minor candidates are those cast by diehard supporters who do not care that their favorite candi-
date is certain to lose. If we assume that all minor candidates have similar proportions of such 
hard core supporters, all minor candidates should suffer similar rates of defection. We shall call 
this the uniform rate hypothesis.  
But voters may not believe that all minor candidates are equally nonviable. Some voters 
may view minor candidates with relatively high levels of support as more deserving of loyalty 
than those with lower levels. Voters might erroneously interpret vote intention percentages as 
indicative of the probability of winning. Relatively stronger minor candidates also receive more 
media attention, which may also lead some of their supporters to infer that they have a chance of 
winning. In any case, we examine an alternative, declining rate hypothesis concerning tactical 
voting: the higher the level of support for a minor candidate, the less that candidate suffers from 
defections due to tactical voting.    
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As in previous studies of tactical voting, the hypotheses we have formulated concern only 
the relatively small number of voters who most preferred one of the minor candidates.  In Part III 
of this study we investigate another type of sophisticated voting, relevant to a much larger num-
ber of voters, that arose from the two-part structure of the ballot, i.e., the initial recall question 
followed by the replacement election. In the case of voters whose most preferred candidate was 
not Davis, the candidate they preferred in the replacement election could win only if Davis lost. 
Voting straightforwardly would thus mean voting in favor of the recall.  But some voters whose 
most preferred candidate was not Davis might also have believed that Davis wasn’t that bad—or 
at least not bad enough to deserve being recalled. Supporters of other candidates might have also 
feared that someone they liked even less than Davis might win the replacement election. Conse-
quently, some voters, even though they preferred another candidate over Davis, might have voted 
against the recall.  We refer to such voters as hedge voters.         
As suggested above, we can distinguish at least two different motives for hedge voting, 
and use the data on preference orderings developed in Part I to test two competing hypotheses. 
The first, the simple hedge voting hypothesis, holds that voters’ decisions concerning the recall 
question are purely a function of the utility they would receive from Davis retaining office. Ope-
rationally, this implies that the higher that voters rank Davis in their preference orderings, the 
more likely they are to vote against the recall. The second, the conditional hedge voting hypothe-
sis, holds that hedge voting was also motivated by fear of an alternative worse than Davis: voters 
who believed that a candidate they disliked more than Davis had a good chance of winning the 
replacement election sh ould have also been more to cast a hedge vote against Davis’s recall. The 
results of our analyses provide strong support for the simple hedge voting hypothesis, but no evi-
dence of conditional hedge voting could be detected.   
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PART I   TRANSITIVITY IN INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE ORDERINGS 
We begin by considering some basic questions about this election. First, to what extent were the 
preference orderings of California recall voters transitive? The California recall ballot listed 136 
candidates—Gray Davis, and 135 candidates vying to replace him. As a practical matter it was 
impossible to elicit preferences over all of them, and in any case the vast majority of these candi-
dates were unknown to all but a small handful of voters. Our analysis is thus restricted, for the 
most part, to the four most important candidates: 
1. Gray Davis, the incumbent governor subject to the recall, was a long-time figure in California 
Democratic politics. Davis served as state Controller and Lieutenant Governor before being 
elected Governor in 1998. He was reelected in 2002 in a closely contested race, but efforts to re-
call him commenced soon after his reelection. 
2. Arnold Schwarzenegger, a moderate Republican, was best known prior to 2003 for his roles in 
action-oriented blockbuster films. His initial foray into California politics came in 2002, when he 
led the campaign for Proposition 49, a measure that increased funding for after-school programs. 
3. Cruz Bustamante was a well-known Democratic politician. After serving in the legislature and 
becoming Speaker of the Assembly, he was elected Lieutenant Governor in 1998, becoming the 
first Latino elected to statewide office in California in more than a century. 
4. Tom McClintock was a long-time Republican member of the California legislature, most re-
cently serving as state senator from a district located in northwestern Los Angeles County. Vow-
ing to reduce taxes and cut expenditures, McClintock narrowly lost the election for state control-
ler in 2002. 
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The question of recalling Davis was favored by 55.4 per cent of the voters. Schwarzeneg-
ger, Bustamante, and McClintock won 48.6 per cent, 31.5 per cent, and 13.4 per cent of the vote, 
respectively, in the replacement election. The only other candidate to receive more than one per 
cent in that contest was Green Party candidate Peter Camejo, with 2.8 per cent. 
In addition to being transitive or not, individual preference orderings can be more or less 
complete. While some individuals may be able to order all relevant alternatives, others may be 
indifferent between one or more choices. Allowing for indifference requires the following rela-
tions to hold if transitivity is to be satisfied:  
 
Preference for A over B and for B over C implies preference for A over C. 
  
A f B
B f C
⎫ ⎬ ⎭ ⇒ A f C  
Indifference between A and B and between B and C implies indifference between A and C. 
A ~ B
B ~ C
⎫ ⎬ ⎭ ⇒ A ~ C  
Preference for A over B and indifference between B and C implies preference for A over C. 
  
A f B
B ~ C
⎫ ⎬ ⎭ ⇒ A f C  
Despite the fundamental importance of preference transitivity to the rational choice ap-
proach, there are only two previous studies that explicitly address this matter. Brady and Ansola-
behere report that about 7 per cent of the respondents who ranked a list of five candidates in the 
1976 presidential primaries (Brown, Carter, Humphrey, Jackson, and Udall) exhibited violations 
of transitivity. 13 The rate of intransitivity rose to over 20 per cent when a sixth candidate (Ford) 
was added to the list. They also observed that preference orderings were more deficient in terms 
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of completeness, i.e., an inability or unwillingness to choose one candidate over another. Radcliff 
finds that virtually no respondents in the 1972-84 American National Election Studies violated 
transitivity when evaluating sets of three candidates, but about 8 per cent did so in their orderings 
over four candidates. 14  When five candidates were being evaluated this rate rose to over 15 per 
cent, which is more than twice the rate of intransitivity detected by Brady and Ansolabehere. In 
any case, both studies suggest that the more alternatives people have to consider, the more likely 
their preference orderings are to be intransitive.  
In undertaking this analysis, it was imperative that we ascertain voters’ preference order-
ings as accurately as possible. Survey research has relied heavily upon ‘feeling thermometers’ to 
assess voters’ preferences. These measures ask respondents to rate candidates on a 0-100 scale 
according to how warmly they feel toward them. Assigning one candidate a higher thermometer 
score than another is assumed to indicate preference for that candidate over the other.  But warm 
feelings do not necessarily translate into preferences. In Weisberg and Miller’s study, about 20 
per cent of the respondents expressed an intention to vote for a candidate other than the one to 
whom they had assigned the highest thermometer score. 15 Bartels reports that 10 per cent of res-
pondents intended to vote for the candidate to whom they had assigned the lowest thermometer 
score, 16 while over 5 per cent indicated that they would vote for a candidate whom they had not 
even rated on the thermometer measure. Other studies have also found discrepancies of varying 
magnitudes between voting choices and thermometer scores.17   
Even if measurement problems were negligible, feeling thermometers cannot be used to 
gauge the extent to which voters have transitive preference orderings because transitivity is 
locked in a priori. Assume that when asked to assign thermometer scores, a respondent picks a 
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random number between 0 and 100 for each candidate. The resultant numbers, arranged from 
highest to lowest, necessarily yield a transitive preference ordering.   
For these reasons we use a different method for identifying preference orderings. On both 
measurement grounds 18 and in terms of consistency with rational choice theory,19 the gold stan-
dard for eliciting preferences is to present respondents a series of pairwise choices involving all 
the alternatives in the choice set. Their responses are then correlated to yield an overall prefe-
rence ordering. For the four main candidates involved in the recall (Davis, Schwarzenegger, Bus-
tamante, and McClintock) only six pairwise comparisons are required. The pairwise comparison 
questions were posed as follows: 
      We would like to begin by having you make a series of one-on-one comparisons be-
tween the major candidates. Regardless of whom you actually intend to vote for, please 
tell me which candidate you most prefer in the pairs I will present to you…How about 
Gray Davis and Arnold Schwarzenegger? Do you prefer Davis over Schwarzenegger or 
Schwarzenegger over Davis? 
 
This was followed by the other pairwise comparisons. CATI technology allowed us to systemati-
cally rotate the order of the six questions. As in the Brady and Ansolabehere study, we did not 
explicitly offer respondents the choice of indifference between candidates, but coded them as 
being indifferent if they did not choose one over the other. 20      
Table 1 reports the preference orderings derived from choices made in these compari-
sons. Nearly 51 per cent of the respondents exhibited complete, transitive preference orderings, a 
figure that is very similar to the 52 per cent in Brady and Ansolabehere’s five-candidate sample. 
Another 27 per cent had transitive orderings, but were indifferent between one pair of candi-
dates—a figure that was also similar to that obtained by Brady and Ansolabehere. Those in the 
‘transitive, two indifferences’ category also had no problems with intransitivity, but grouped the 
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four candidates into a top and bottom pair in a party-based fashion. Twenty-two of these 23 res-
pondents were indifferent between Schwarzenegger and McClintock, and also indifferent be-
tween Davis and Bustamante, but ranked one pair over the other.  
Table 1 about here please 
Placement in the ‘transitive over three’ category means that the respondent ranked three 
candidates transitively, but could not rank the remaining candidate. One such respondent, for ex-
ample, preferred Schwarzenegger to Davis and Davis to Bustamante, and also preferred Schwar-
zenegger to McClintock, but expressed no preference in the comparisons between McClintock 
and Davis or McClintock and Bustamante. Brady and Ansolabehere describe such preference 
orderings as ‘interval-ordered,’ while Radcliff labels them ‘quasi-transitive.’ 21 They believe, as 
do we, that this pattern arises when respondents have transitive preferences but ‘thick’ indiffe-
rence curves involving some of the candidate choices. In these cases, a most preferred candidate 
can still be identified. Confidence that these respondents had coherent preferences is bolstered by 
the vote choices they reported. Only two of the 82 respondents in this category made choices that 
were not sensible, e.g., not voting for Schwarzenegger when Schwarzenegger was the candidate 
they most preferred. As we shall see, this error rate is on par with the overall error rates we ob-
served in our survey.  
Although preference ordering may seem like too strong a term to characterize those in the 
‘Only top choice identified’ category, they do satisfy, albeit minimally, the canons of rationality. 
The respondents here always reported a preference for one particular candidate in comparisons 
with the other three candidates, but that is all. In all comparisons not involving their favorite 
candidate, they were indifferent between the two candidates presented to them.  
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Remarkably, only 3.3 per cent of the respondents manifested intransitivity in their prefe-
rence orderings. Most were afflicted by an explicit preference cycle, while some violated transi-
tivity with an inappropriate indifference relation, e.g., preferring Schwarzenegger over Davis, 
indifferent between Davis and Bustamante, but preferring Bustamante over Schwarzenegger. 
Some exhibited both pathologies. The 3.3 per cent figure that we observed is considerably lower 
than the amount of intransitivity detected in the two previous studies of voter preference transi-
tivity, and the levels they reported were already very low.  Of all the assumptions that are com-
monly made by rational choice theorists, the assumption that individual preference orderings are 
transitive may well be the most realistic. 
Why did we observe less intransitivity?  It could be because we elicited preferences over 
only four candidates, as opposed to Brady and Ansolabehere’s batteries of five and six candi-
dates, and because Radcliff used a different method for deriving preference orderings. Another 
possible reason why respondents in our survey were less prone to intransitivity might have been 
because the candidate choices were more distinctive, particularly on ideological grounds, but 
there are reasons to believe this was not the case. Radcliff’s batteries of choices involved candi-
dates from both parties, e.g., Reagan, Mondale, and Hart in 1984, as well as the independent An-
derson in 1980. The rate of intransitivity that Brady and Ansolabehere report rises significantly 
when a sixth candidate is added to the group of five 1976 Democratic primary contenders, but 
this sixth candidate was the Republican  president Gerald Ford, who was presumably quite easy 
to distinguish from the others.  It is also possible that our more impressive lack of intransitivity 
was due to the fact that the pairwise comparison questions were the first ones asked on the sur-
vey, and were thus less likely to be answered by respondents who had become tired or bored. In 
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any case, only a tiny minority of the respondents in our survey displayed intransitivity in their 
preference orderings.   
The voting choices of many individuals who exhibited intransitivity in their preference 
orderings over the four major candidates were not necessarily afflicted by this pathology.  In ad-
dition to the six pairwise comparisons questions, we also asked respondents, ‘Is there any other 
candidate on the ballot whom you prefer over all the candidates I’ve mentioned so far?’ Five of 
the 49 respondents in the intransitive category reported that they intended to vote for Camejo or 
one of the other lesser candidates. Intransitivity is not necessarily a problem when the alterna-
tives involved are all dominated by another choice. Two other respondents had a clear favorite 
among the major candidates, as the intransitivity in their preference orderings was confined to 
lesser preferred candidates. Nine others indicated that they did not intend to vote in the recall 
election. 
Previous studies have found that higher levels of indifference are associated with lower 
rates of turnout.22  This was also true in the case of California recall voters. Of those respondents 
who were indifferent between none of the candidate pairs, 87 per cent reported that they intended 
to vote (or that they had already voted) in the recall election. 23 Turnout declined steadily in each 
successive category displayed in Table 1, down to 70 per cent among those respondents whose 
preference orderings were so incomplete that only a top choice could be identified. Only 32 per 
cent of the small number of respondents who were unable or unwilling to rank any of the candi-
dates above any of the others said that they would vote in the recall election. We surmise that 
there is a nexus of positive associations linking higher rates of political participation with more 
interest in politics, more political information, and more consistent and fully articulated prefe-
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rence orderings. Unfortunately, we did not include questions in our survey that would have al-
lowed a fuller investigation of these relationships.          
The outcomes of the pairwise comparisons necessarily reveal which of the candidates, if 
any, was the Condorcet winner. Many speculated before the election that the structure of the re-
call ballot, which partitioned the ballot into an up-or-down vote on Davis followed by the sepa-
rate replacement election, would lead to the selection of a candidate who did not satisfy the Con-
dorcet criterion. One possibility was that Davis was the Condorcet winner, but would not prevail 
on the initial recall question. It also seemed possible that with 135 candidates competing in the 
replacement election, the plurality winner would not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. And of 
course it is always necessary to entertain the possibility of a voting cycle, in which case a Con-
dorcet winner does not exist.  
As it turned out, there was a Condorcet winner in the 2003 California recall. Schwarze-
negger topped all the other major candidates—Davis, Bustamante, and McClintock—in the 
pairwise comparisons. The unusual nature of the election and the peculiar structure of the ballot 
thus did not prevent California voters from electing the Condorcet winner. One factor that made 
it extremely likely that a Condorcet winner was present at all is that a majority of voters exhi-
bited single-peaked preferences over the four major candidates along a single, liberal-
conservative dimension. According to Niemi, even a small amount of unidimensionality in vot-
ers’ preferences dramatically reduces the likelihood of a voting cycle. 24 Assuming that Busta-
mante, Davis, Schwarzenegger, and McClintock are positioned from left to right along this di-
mension, we calculate that 59.4 per cent of the respondents who could rank order three or more 
candidates had single-peaked preferences. This is very similar to the 58.2 per cent figure ob-
tained by Niemi and Wright in a similar analysis of four-candidate groupings of leading U.S. 
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presidential candidates in the pre-election wave of the 1980 National Election Study. 25 To some, 
of course, it may seem more remarkable that over four out of ten respondents in both studies did 
not appear to use an underlying liberal-conservative dimension in evaluating candidates.      
 
PART II TACTICAL VOTING IN THE REPLACEMENT ELECTION 
Although pre-election commercial polls regarding the recall election were fairly volatile, 
Schwarzenegger and Bustamante were always the top two candidates in the replacement elec-
tion. To the extent supporters of minor candidates decided that they would be wasting their vote 
if they did not vote for one of the front-runners, Schwarzenegger and Bustamante would both 
benefit from tactical voting. But how exactly is it that supporters of minor candidates decide to 
cast a tactical vote?  Palfrey’s treatment of Duverger’s Law holds that in equilibrium, when vot-
ers take into account the strategic behaviour of others, only the top two candidates in a plurality 
rule contest have a chance of winning. 26 Thus the probability of being pivotal in an election is 
positive only when one casts a vote for one of the top two candidates, and is zero if one instead 
votes for a minor candidate. Minor candidates should therefore receive no votes whatsoever. 
Given that voters in a large election has an effectively zero chance of being pivotal regardless of 
what they do, a more realistic variation on this line of reasoning holds that the votes received by 
minor candidates are those cast by supporters who are intent on ‘sending a message’ and are un-
deterred by the prospect of certain defeat.  Jackman finds that those who voted for Ralph Nader 
in 2000 were indeed diehards. 27 After the election, fewer than one in ten Nader voters reported 
that if they had it to do over again they would have voted for either Gore or Bush. Assuming that 
all minor candidates have similar shares of diehard supporters, all minor candidates should suffer 
similar, high rates of strategic defection. We call this the ‘uniform rate’ hypothesis. 
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But voters may not believe that all minor candidates are equally nonviable. Some voters 
may instead view minor candidates with relatively high levels of support as more deserving of 
loyalty than minor candidates with lower levels of support. This could happen if voters interpret 
vote intention percentages as indicative of the probability of winning. They may believe, for ex-
ample, that a candidate supported by 15 per cent of the respondents in a pre-election poll has a 
15 per cent chance of winning, while a candidate supported by 5 per cent of those polled has a 5 
per cent chance of winning.  Relatively stronger minor candidates also receive more media atten-
tion, which may also lead their supporters to infer that they have at least some chance of win-
ning. In any case, what we call the declining rate hypothesis holds that the higher the level of 
support there is for a minor candidate, the less that candidate suffers from tactical voting.  
As indicated earlier in our discussion of the motivation for tactical voting, we character-
ize tactical voters as rationalistic: whether their behaviour conforms more closely to the uniform 
rate or to the declining rate hypothesis, they decide to vote for a lesser-preferred candidate as if 
they are (or might reasonably expect to be) the pivotal voter, even though the probability of this 
actually being the case is zero.  In the scenario described above, in an election with two major 
candidates garnering most of the votes, a minor candidate registering 15 per cent support in the 
polls has the same chance of winning as a candidate supported by 5 per cent, and that chance is 
zero. The declining rate hypothesis nonetheless posits that the first candidate will suffer a lower 
rate of losses from tactical voting than the second. Evidence for the declining rate hypothesis 
would thus be indicative of another manifestation of rationalistic decision-making, in that it im-
plies voters react to perceived differences in probability that are not actually present.  
We are able to test the relative merits of these competing hypotheses with data from our 
survey because the many minor candidates in the contest to replace Davis differed markedly in 
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their levels of support. Tom McClintock ran well behind both Schwarzenegger and Bustamante 
in pre-election polls, but consistently polled in the double digits. Green Party candidate Peter 
Camejo polled well behind McClintock, and support for all other candidates was in the trace 
element range. In the end, McClintock received 13.5 per cent, Camejo followed with 2.8 per 
cent, and the 131 candidates in the peloton garnered the residual 3.6 per cent.  
Did McClintock, Camejo, and all the other minor candidates experience similar defection 
rates, as the uniform rate hypothesis would predict? Or, in line with the declining rate hypothesis, 
did Camejo suffer from a higher rate of strategic defection than McClintock, and the many fringe 
candidates higher rates of defection than Camejo? Comparing the candidate preference orderings 
and vote declarations of respondents in our survey allows us to assess the relative merits of these 
two competing hypotheses.28 Preferences for Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, McClintock, and 
Davis were derived from responses to the six pairwise comparisons. An additional follow-up 
question allowed respondents to identify their most preferred candidate as someone other than 
those four.   
The figures in the first column of Table 2 show that a third of the respondents most pre-
ferred Schwarzenegger, a fifth chose McClintock, and only one in ten most preferred Busta-
mante. Not quite 6 per cent selected Camejo, while another 4.4 per cent named one of several 
others. Voters’ preferences reflected their partisan affiliations and ideological leanings, which we 
gauged by asking them a) a standard party identification question, and b) whether their views on 
political issues were conservative, moderate, or liberal, and, if conservative or liberal, whether 
they were strongly or moderately so. McClintock supporters were more Republican and more 
conservative than Schwarzenegger supporters, and Schwarzenegger supporters more Republican 
and more conservative than supporters of Davis and Bustamante.  
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Table 2 about here please 
Tactical voting benefits the top two candidates in an election, and all others are correspondingly 
hurt by defection of their supporters to the top two. The entries in Table 2 show that the percen-
tage of voters who most preferred Schwarzenegger was larger than the percentage of voters who 
voted for Bustamante. This implies that he would have won the replacement election even if he 
had received no tactical votes, but a substantial share of his votes did come from those voters 
who cast tactical votes in his favor. Bustamante, the first choice of only one in ten voters, re-
ceived over two-thirds of his votes from those who most preferred another candidate. Most of 
them were Davis supporters, who were necessarily constrained to vote for someone else. The 
combination of Bustamante and Davis supporters sums to 34.1 per cent, which closely approx-
imates Bustamante’s 32.8 per cent share of the votes in the replacement election.     
A more complete picture of tactical voting in the replacement election emerges from Ta-
ble 3, which reports the choices of voters broken down by which candidate they most preferred. 
Theoretically, Schwarzenegger and Bustamante should have suffered no strategic defections, and 
the entries in the first two rows of Table 3 show that less than 3 per cent of their supporters re-
ported voted for someone else. We were of course curious as to why any of Schwarzenegger’s or 
Bustamante’s supporters would choose to vote for someone else, and closely examined the small 
number of cases in which this occurred. Those who made such choices—11 of Schwarzenegger’s 
supporters, 3 of Bustamante’s—were not distinctive in terms of education, income, ideology, 
gender, or ethnicity.  
Table 3 about here please 
It is our sense that discrepancies between preferences and vote choice involving the top 
two candidates represent a small but irreducible rate of error in survey response.29  Respondents 
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sometimes don’t hear a question clearly or misunderstand it. Interviewers occasionally read 
questions incorrectly, or mistype a keystroke. Perhaps a small number of respondents change 
their rankings of candidates during the course of the interview. Others may be distracted or not 
be paying close attention to the questions.30  In any case, these results indicate that the preference 
orderings we inferred from the candidate pairwise comparisons are far more accurate and reliable 
than orderings derived from feeling thermometers. Fewer than 3 per cent of the voters in our sur-
vey whose most preferred candidate was Bustamante or Schwarzenegger reported that they had 
voted or intended to vote for someone else.  Previous studies using feeling thermometers to esti-
mate preference orderings typically report percentages of respondents not voting for their most 
preferred candidate (in situations where tactical voting is not a consideration) ranging between 
10 per cent to 20 per cent.31       
The remaining rows of Table 3 report the vote decisions of those whose most preferred 
candidate was not one of the frontrunners in the replacement election. The uniform rate hypothe-
sis holds that because none of the minor candidates had a chance of winning, the votes they re-
ceived are confined to those cast by diehard supporters undeterred by the prospect of certain de-
feat. Assuming that each candidate had about the same share of diehards, McClintock, Camejo, 
and the many other minor candidates should have suffer rates of defection. The declining rate 
hypothesis, in contrast, posits that voters are more loyal to minor candidates with relatively high 
levels of support than to those with lower levels of support. For a number of reasons, it may 
seem more reasonable to voters to remain loyal to a serious third-place candidate like McClin-
tock than to a more obscure politician like Camejo, and another thing entirely to vote for a can-
didate whose support is in the trace element range. If so, Camejo should have suffered a higher 
rate of defection than McClintock, and the fringe candidates a higher rate than Camejo.   
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The evidence reported in Table 3 supports the declining rate hypothesis: the rate of tac-
tical voting varies directly with the candidate’s level of support. While nearly 62 per cent of 
those who most preferred McClintock voted for him as well, Camejo retained less than half of 
those who most preferred him. Supporters of less prominent candidates were even more inclined 
to cast a tactical vote, as over two-thirds of those in the ‘other’ category indicated voting for a 
less preferred candidate. Differences between the rate of tactical voting by McClintock suppor-
ters and Camejo supporters, as well as between McClintock supporters and supporters of the 
many fringe candidates, were statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Because of the small 
number of observations involved, the difference between the rates of strategic voting by Camejo 
supporters and the fringe candidate supporters was not significant. Overall, though, our data in-
dicate that minor candidates do not, as implied by the uniform rate hypothesis, all fall off the 
same cliff of nonviability.  
 The declining rate hypothesis thus offers some hope to minor party candidates in winner-
take-all plurality elections, in that the better they do in terms of support in the electorate, the bet-
ter they do in terms of lowering the rate of tactical defection.32  The results of our analysis indi-
cate that minor candidates can muster a decent showing at the polls even though they have no 
chance of winning. This being the case, they may be able to survive until the next election cycle, 
continue to command media attention, and perhaps ultimately become successful. That tactical 
voting works in this way may be one reason why third (or fourth) parties are so often present in 
plurality regimes, why some eventually attain major party status, and why Duverger’s ‘Law’ is 
more accurately characterized as a general tendency.33      
The last row of Table 3 reports the voting decisions in the replacement election of those 
who most preferred Gray Davis, whom they were unable to vote for. As the entries in Table 2 
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presaged, most (83.3 per cent) supported Bustamante, while fewer than 5 per cent opted for 
Schwarzenegger. Davis supporters who voted for either Bustamante or Schwarzenegger were 
almost always opting for their second choice. The choice confronting the small number of Davis 
supporters whose next preference was McClintock was more interesting: vote for McClintock, 
even though he had no chance of winning, or vote for their third choice, e.g., Bustamante, to 
counter the candidate they favored least, e.g. Schwarzenegger. It turns out that only 24 per cent 
of them (4 of 17) dropped down to their third choice to vote for Bustamante, and none did so to 
vote for Schwarzenegger. A few Davis supporters voted for Camejo (4.5 per cent) or one of the 
other minor candidates (1.6 per cent).  
McClintock supporters comprised by far the largest group of voters who were in a posi-
tion to cast a tactical vote in the replacement election, and so we performed some additional ana-
lyses of their choices. Given that the key rationale in the conventional account of tactical voting 
is the realization that one’s most preferred candidate has no realistic chance of winning, we 
asked respondents in our survey how likely each of the major replacement election candidates 
were to win. McClintock supporters who were more optimistic about his chances were more loy-
al. Of the McClintock supporters who reported a belief that McClintock was ‘very likely’ or 
‘somewhat likely’ to win the election, 74 per cent remained loyal to McClintock, compared to 
only 54 per cent of his supporters who perceived him to be ‘somewhat unlikely’ or ‘very unlike-
ly’ to win.  
It is unwise, however, to take these respondents’ subjective probabilities at face value. 
First, the plain fact is that McClintock, who always ran far behind both Schwarzenegger and 
Bustamante in the polls, was far more likely to win the state lottery than he was to win this elec-
tion.  Secondly, voters whose most preferred candidate was McClintock were more than twice as 
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likely as nonsupporters to report that McClintock was ‘very likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to win. 
Many McClintock supporters were clearly engaging in wishful thinking. Supporters of all other 
major candidates in the recall election (Davis, Bustamante, and Schwarzenegger) were also much 
more optimistic about their candidates’ chances than were nonsupporters. Wishful thinking by 
voters has been documented in several previous studies, and may largely be a costless expression 
of enthusiasm for one’s favorite candidate.34 
Table 4, which breaks down the choices of McClintock supporters by whom they ranked 
second in their preference orderings, presents a more telling look at their voting decisions. Near-
ly three out of four McClintock supporters ranked Schwarzenegger second, which is not surpris-
ing.  Schwarzenegger lacked the conservative credentials of McClintock, but he was surely ideo-
logically more palatable to McClintock voters than Bustamante.  Nearly half of these voters cast 
a tactical vote for Schwarzenegger. McClintock supporters who ranked Bustamante or Davis 
next in their preference orderings were far less common, and all but a few of them voted sincere-
ly for McClintock. The last column in Table 4 shows, as one would expect, that voters who 
ranked McClintock first but failed to rank any other candidate were also extremely loyal to 
McClintock.  
Table 4 about here please 
We infer from these results that McClintock supporters who ranked Davis or Bustamante 
ahead of Schwarzenegger objected to Schwarzenegger primarily on non-ideological grounds. 
Perhaps they were put off by accounts of his antics as a movie star, saw him as an opportunist, or 
were suspicious that he had married Maria Shriver, a scion of the most prominent Democratic 
family (the Kennedys) in the country. Whatever their reasons, after rejecting Schwarzenegger, 
most found the prospect of voting for the liberal Bustamante unpalatable.  
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In sum, the pattern of tactical voting observed in the replacement election adds credence 
to the concept that voters are rationalistic. They have clear, consistent preference orderings over 
the major candidates, and the choices they make logically follow from their preference orderings. 
As indicated previously, however, the many voters in our survey who cast tactical votes appear 
to be acting as if they believe their vote might be pivotal even though there is no possibility of 
this being the case. Empirical support for the declining rate hypothesis, furthermore, suggests 
that voters make choices that are conditioned upon perceived differences in probabilities that are 
not actually present. Additionally, voters’ assessments of the likelihood that their preferred can-
didate would win often reflected highly unrealistic, wishful thinking.   
 
PART III   HEDGE VOTING AND THE RECALL QUESTION  
As in previous studies of tactical voting, our analysis of the replacement election concerns only 
voters who most preferred one of the minor candidates. In the 2003 recall, however, the two-part 
structure of the ballot—the question of whether or not to recall Gray Davis, followed by a plural-
ity election to select a replacement—extended the opportunity to vote sophisticatedly to a much 
larger share of the electorate. While those who most preferred Davis could not vote for him in 
the replacement election, the tables were turned on the initial recall question. Here voters had 
only Davis to vote for or against. Those voters whose favorite candidate was Davis presumably 
would vote sincerely in accordance with their preferences and oppose the recall, and we would 
expect those whose least favorite was Davis to vote sincerely in favor of Davis’ recall.  
All other voters, i.e., the 41 per cent of the voters who ranked Davis neither first nor last, 
confronted an interesting choice. Given that the candidate they preferred in the replacement elec-
tion could win only if Davis lost the recall contest, voting straightforwardly would mean voting 
 24 
 
in favor of recalling him. We refer to such voters as ‘bullet’ voters. But what if voters, even 
though they preferred someone else to Davis, didn’t think he was that bad—or at least not bad 
enough to deserve being recalled? Supporters of other candidates might have also feared that 
someone they liked even less than Davis might win the replacement election. Even though they 
preferred another candidate over Davis, some might have hedged their bets and voted against the 
recall. By their reasoning, it would be ideal if their preferred candidate became governor, but it 
would be better to retain Davis than end up with an even worse alternative. We refer to such vot-
ers as ‘hedge’ voters.   
Bustamante, at least at the beginning of his campaign, called upon his supporters to cast a 
hedge vote and to oppose the recall of fellow Democrat Davis. But how many followed this di-
rective?  For hedge voters, the candidate they supported in the replacement election could be-
come governor only if the outcome of the recall (Davis is recalled) ran counter to how they voted 
(against the recall).  This cognitive dissonance might have been troubling to some voters, making 
hedge voting less attractive than conventional tactical voting.  Similarly, Davis supporters be-
lieved that while many Democratic voters would reluctantly back Davis on a simple up-or-down 
vote, a Democratic alternative to Davis would let them off the hook, so to speak. Because they 
were going to back their party’s candidate in the replacement election, they could vote for Davis’ 
recall without feeling disloyal.35  Davis supporters understood that for Bustamante, the ‘vote for 
me but against the recall’ message was not incentive-compatible, and they perceived, correctly 
we think, that the Bustamante campaign ultimately spent little time and effort in opposing Davis’ 
recall.  
We test two alternative hypotheses concerning hedge voting. The first, the ‘simple hedge 
voting’ hypothesis, holds that voters engage in hedge voting purely as a function of the relative 
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amount of utility they would receive from Davis retaining office. How good or bad is Davis 
compared to the other candidates available?  Operationally, this implies that the lower that voters 
rank Davis in their preference orderings, the more likely they are to vote for the recall.  
The second, the ‘conditional hedge voting’ hypothesis, holds that hedge voting was also 
motivated by fear of an alternative worse than Davis. According to this hypothesis, voters who 
believed that a candidate they disliked more than Davis had a good chance of winning the re-
placement election would have been more likely, ceteris paribus, to cast a hedge vote against 
Davis’ recall than were those who believed that this opponent was likely to lose the replacement 
election. The hypothesis takes operational form by positing that for Bustamante supporters, the 
more likely they were to think that Schwarzenegger would win the replacement election, the 
more likely they should be to cast hedge votes against Davis’ recall. In the case of Schwarzeneg-
ger and McClintock supporters, the more likely they were to think that Bustamante would win 
the replacement election, the more likely they should be to cast hedge votes against the recall.  
Both sets of voters, of course, must also prefer Davis to their favorite candidate’s major oppo-
nent in the replacement election.  
Voters’ decisions concerning the recall question potentially depended upon many consid-
erations—the utility derived from retaining Davis, the utility derived from the election of the  
candidate they supported in the replacement election (not necessarily their favorite), and the utili-
ty derived from the election of other candidates. The standard theory of tactical voting holds that 
they should also evaluate the probabilities of casting a pivotal vote under different scenarios. In 
principle, then, a complete analysis of voters’ decisions regarding the recall would entail consid-
eration of their entire preference ordering and the probabilities of winning associated with each 
candidate—a daunting prospect, as voters in our survey reported 84 distinct patterns of prefe-
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rences over the four major candidates (Davis, Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, and McClintock), 
and dozens more were we to consider the preference orderings of those who most favored a mi-
nor candidate.  
Fortunately, we can simplify matters greatly by taking an initial look at the data purely in 
terms of the simple hedge voting hypothesis. This hypothesis implies that the major contours of 
voting patterns on the recall question can be discerned by aggregating preference orderings ac-
cording to the voters’ utility of retaining Gray Davis in office relative to that of electing various 
other candidates. In Table 5 we report the percentage of each candidate’s supporters who voted 
for the recall, broken down by their ranking of Davis—second, third, or last.  
Table 5 about here please 
Looking first at Schwarzenegger supporters, we see that few of these voters ranked Davis 
second, and nearly two-thirds of them ranked him last. Those who ranked Davis either third or at 
the bottom voted overwhelmingly for the recall, but Davis fared badly even among the small 
number of Schwarzenegger’s supporters who ranked him second: over 80 per cent of these voters 
also cast a bullet vote in favor of recalling Davis. McClintock supporters were a bit more likely 
than Schwarzenegger’s to rank Davis second, but nearly 90 per cent of them still put Davis third 
or last in their rankings. On the other hand, the degree to which McClintock supporters favored 
the recall varied dramatically with their ranking of Davis. Only 27 per cent of McClintock’s sup-
porters who ranked Davis second favored the recall, compared to nearly 90 per cent of those who 
ranked him lower. Voters whose favorite was Camejo or one of the minor candidates generally 
placed Davis higher in their orderings than did McClintock supporters, and their support for the 
recall was also sensitive to Davis’ ranking. Few who ranked Davis second favored his recall, but 
those who put him at the bottom of their list favored the recall unanimously.     
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Not surprisingly, supporters of fellow Democrat Cruz Bustamante tended to rank Davis 
higher than did supporters of the Republican candidates, as most ranked him second and few 
ranked him last.  Nearly 75 per cent of the Bustamante supporters who ranked Davis second cast 
a hedge vote against Davis’ recall. In contrast, half of the Bustamante supporters who ranked 
Davis third cast a bullet vote in favor of the recall, as did three out of four who ranked Davis last.  
As impressive as the amount of hedge voting might be to voting theorists, supporters of 
Gray Davis were not impressed by what they viewed to be a lack of reciprocity on the part of 
Bustamante supporters. Although 83 per cent of Davis’ supporters backed Bustamante in the re-
placement election (see Table 3), overall only 62 per cent of Bustamante’s supporters backed 
Davis by voting against the recall.  It must be kept in mind, however, that for most Davis suppor-
ters, voting for Bustamante in the replacement election was a straightforward, sincere vote. For 
Bustamante supporters, on the other hand, voting against Davis’s recall was a sophisticated vote 
that entailed some degree of cognitive dissonance and bad incentives.  
Did the lack of support from Bustamante’s supporters cost Davis the governorship? Vot-
ers whose favorite candidate was Bustamante accounted for about 10 per cent of the electorate. If 
they had voted against the recall at the same rate that Davis supporters backed Bustamante in the 
replacement election (83 per cent), the vote against the recall would have been about 2 per cent 
higher, i.e., around 47 per cent—closer, but not a different outcome.  
The second hypothesis to consider here, that of conditional hedge voting, holds that vot-
ers were more likely to cast a hedge vote against Davis’ recall if they perceived that someone 
they liked less than Davis might win the replacement election. To engage in conditional hedge 
voting requires ranking a major opponent to one’s favorite candidate below Davis. In our analy-
sis we restrict our attention to Schwarzenegger and McClintock supporters who ranked Davis 
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ahead of Bustamante, and Bustamante supporters who ranked Davis ahead of Schwarzenegger. 
This excludes few Bustamante supporters, as 89 per cent of them ranked Davis over Schwarze-
negger.  But 58 per cent of McClintock supporters and 76 per cent of the Schwarzenegger sup-
porters ranked Davis behind Bustamante, and so were not in a position to engage in conditional 
hedge voting.     
For supporters of each major candidate in the replacement election, and whose preference 
orderings make conditional hedge voting an appropriate strategy, we report two columns of data 
in Table 6. The first column is the percentage of respondents who perceive that their favorite 
candidate’s major opponent in the replacement election (Bustamante in the case of Schwarze-
negger and McClintock supporters, and Schwarzenegger in the case of Bustamante supporters) 
was either ‘very likely’ to receive the most votes in the replacement election, ‘somewhat likely,’ 
‘somewhat unlikely,’ or ‘very unlikely.’ The entry in the second column reports the percentage 
of voters in each of these categories that favored Davis’ recall.  
As indicated previously, voter’s assessments of the likelihood that their favorite candidate 
would win the election were strongly biased by wishful thinking. Their assessments of how like-
ly other candidates were to win the election also reflected some degree of ‘reverse’ wishful 
thinking, i.e., perceptions that candidates they did not like were more likely to lose. Nearly 40 
per cent of Bustamante supporters, for instance, reported a belief that Schwarzenegger was likely 
to lose.  Still, most McClintock and Schwarzenegger supporters believed Bustamante was unlike-
ly to win, while most Bustamante supporters believed Schwarzenegger was likely to win.   
Table 6 about here please 
We see little support in Table 6 for the conditional hedge voting hypothesis. Few of 
Schwarzenegger supporters who ranked Davis ahead of Bustamante and who were thus in a posi-
 29 
 
tion to engage in conditional hedge voting appear to have done so. Those who thought Busta-
mante was at least somewhat likely to win the replacement election supported Davis’ recall by 
the same overwhelming margin as those who thought a Bustamante win was very unlikely. 
McClintock and Bustamante voters also exhibited no consistent tendency to condition their vote 
on Davis’ recall upon the perceived likelihood that a candidate they ranked below Davis would 
win the replacement election. 
  In order to conduct a joint test of the simple and conditional hedge voting hypotheses, 
we estimated logit equations of decisions on the recall question made by supporters of Schwar-
zenegger, McClintock, and Bustamante, respectively. Votes on the recall question were coded 0 
if no and 1 if yes. Positive coefficients indicate more support for Davis’ recall. In order to regis-
ter the information reported in Table 5 regarding simple hedge voting, i.e., voters’ utility for re-
taining Davis, each equation specified two dummy variables indicating whether the voter ranked 
Davis third or last (the suppressed reference category was composed of those ranking Davis 
second). The variable that was specified to estimate the extent of conditional hedge voting was 
the voters’ perceptions of the likelihood that their favorite candidate’s main opponent—
Bustamante in the case of Schwarzenegger and McClintock supporters, Schwarzenegger in the 
case of Bustamante supporters—would win the replacement election. Responses of very unlike-
ly, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, and very likely were coded 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
In each case, this variable was specified only for voters who ranked Davis ahead of their favorite 
candidate’s main opponent.  
The three equations also included a set of dummy variables to register demographic and 
ideological characteristics that are generally associated with voting decisions. These include 
dummy variables for voters who are female, Latino, black, have a college degree or even more 
 30 
 
education, and are strongly ideological—strongly conservative in the case of Schwarzenegger 
and McClintock supporters, strongly liberal in the case of Bustamante supporters. Results are 
reported in Table 7.       
Table 7 about here please 
Coefficients of the dummy variables indicating Davis’ placement in voters’ preference 
orderings confirm the strong support for the simple hedge voting hypothesis that was apparent in 
Table 5. Across all three equations, compared to voters in the suppressed reference group who 
ranked Davis second behind their favorite candidate, those who ranked him third were much 
more supportive of his recall, and those who ranked him last were more supportive than those 
who ranked him third. As was also evident in Table 5, this effect was much more pronounced 
among McClintock’s and Bustamante’s supporters than among Schwarzenegger’s.  
In contrast, coefficients of the ‘Main opponent’s chances’ variable were small and insig-
nificant, and the positive sign of the coefficient in the Bustamante equation is the opposite of 
what the conditional hedge voting hypothesis would predict. In short, whether or not supporters 
of other major candidates in the replacement election cast hedge votes against Davis’ recall de-
pended heavily upon how favorably or unfavorably they ranked Davis in their preference order-
ings. Hedge voting did not appear to be motivated by perceptions that a candidate they liked 
even less than Davis was likely to win the replacement election. In contrast to the findings con-
cerning the declining rate hypothesis of tactical voting in the replacement election, which imply 
that voters based their decisions upon differences in probability that did not exist, these results 
imply that voters’ decisions on the recall question incorporated no probability assessments what-
soever.  
 31 
 
The demographic and ideological measures included in these equations were also linked 
to votes on the recall question as expected. Among McClintock supporters, strong conservatives 
were considerably more supportive of Davis’ recall, while among Bustamante supporters strong 
liberals were considerably more opposed. Women whose favorite candidate was Schwarzenegger 
were less supportive of the recall than men. Voting on the recall by Bustamante supporters also 
lined up along ethnic and racial lines, with Latinos more supportive and blacks more opposed 
(both coefficients were just short of achieving conventional levels of statistical significance).    
At this point we return attention back to Table 5. The bottom entry in the last row, which 
reflects the votes on the recall question of those who favored Davis, shows that 6.9 per cent of 
them voted for his recall. This is not a large number, but why would any Davis supporter favor 
his recall?  Similarly, if we sum across supporters of all other candidates, we find that 6.5 per 
cent of those who ranked Davis last voted against the recall. Data always contain error, but we 
suspect that some of the anomalous voting decisions on the recall question were the result of vot-
er confusion as to whether ‘recalling’ Davis meant that he would lose office or retain it. This 
problem characterizes many direct ballot measures, i.e., that being in favor of something requires 
casting a ‘no’ vote.  In this case, a vote in favor of Davis meant voting ‘no’ on the recall. But 
there are additional problems with the word itself. If one is auditioning for a role in a movie or 
play it is good to be recalled, because it means that you have survived a cut. If so, some voters 
might have inferred that voting to recall Davis would keep him in office.  
Fortunately, the wording of the recall question as it actually appeared on the ballot was 
more helpful in this regard than was the question we posed in our survey. We asked, ‘How are 
you going to vote [did you vote] on the question to recall Gray Davis as governor of California. 
Are you going to vote [did you vote] for the recall of Davis, or against it?’ The question voters 
 32 
 
confronted on the ballot was ‘Should Gray Davis be recalled (removed) from the Office of Gov-
ernor?’ Insertion of the word ‘removed’ may have lessened the ambiguity about the meaning of 
the word recall, and thus voters at the polls should have made fewer mistakes than our survey 
respondents. Still, such confusion might have been present in the actual election: election offi-
cials noted that ‘recall’ does not translate well into the Asian languages used in this election, and 
precincts with large numbers of immigrants experienced greater residual vote rates (spoiled bal-
lots) on the recall question.36   
 
DISCUSSION  
Our analysis of survey data concerning preferences over the major candidates in the 2003 Cali-
fornia recall election confirms that one fundamental assumption of rational choice theory is emi-
nently reasonable: individuals’ preference orderings over major candidates are, with few excep-
tions, transitive. Our results also confirm the findings of dozens of previous studies, in that we 
found that large numbers of voters responded to the choices presented to them in the California 
recall by voting tactically. In the replacement part of the election, supporters of minor candidates 
engaged in conventional tactical voting by opting to vote for one of the two leading contenders. 
Many voters also engaged in hedge voting on the recall question itself, choosing to vote against 
Davis’ recall even though they ranked a candidate (or candidates) running in the replacement 
election ahead of Davis.  
Voters’ choices, however, were not conditioned upon probability assessments in a realis-
tic and consistent fashion. The standard account of tactical voting holds that voters make the 
choice to vote for a lesser preferred candidate as if they were (or might reasonably expect to be) 
the pivotal voter, even though in large elections involving millions of voters, the probability of 
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this contingency occurring is effectively zero.  It is for this reason that we characterize tactical 
voting as ‘rationalistic.’  Furthermore, empirical support for the declining rate hypothesis of tac-
tical voting in the replacement election indicates that voters’ choices appeared to be conditioned 
upon perceived differences in probabilities that did not actually exist. On the initial recall ques-
tion, on the other hand, whether or not supporters of other major candidates in the replacement 
election cast hedge votes against Davis’ recall depended upon where they ranked Davis in their 
preference orderings, but were not motivated by the perceived likelihood that someone they liked 
even less than Davis could win the replacement election.  
An inconsistent pattern of results also emerged when we directly asked respondents about 
their probability assessments. McClintock voters who believed that McClintock had at least 
some chance of winning the replacement election were more likely to stay loyal to him, but such 
beliefs were obviously a function of unrealistic, wishful thinking. Voters’ assessments of other 
candidates’ chances were somewhat more realistic, but, as we have just reported, did not appear 
to influence their decisions on how to vote on the initial recall question.   
One might conclude from these results concerning voters’ use of probability assessments 
that probability is something that voters just aren’t very good at. Studies in social psychology 
frequently find that people systematically overestimate the probability of rare events and unde-
restimate the probability of common events, so perhaps our results are just another demonstration 
that for most people, probability is problematic.  But it occurs to us that another explanation for 
this entirely inconsistent pattern of results is that voters aren’t conditioning their decisions upon 
perceived probabilities at all.  In our analysis of hedge voting on the recall, of course, voters do 
not appear to have taken probabilities into account. But if voters are not conditioning their choic-
es upon perceived probabilities, how can we explain tactical voting in the replacement election, 
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or in the dozens of other elections in which it has been detected? Tactical voting has long been 
seen as the consequence of voters deciding that because their favorite candidate has no chance of 
winning but their second choice does, it is better to vote for their second choice. 
Perhaps a better way of thinking about tactical voting is to begin with the fact that in a 
plurality election, voters are constrained by the ballot to cast one vote for one candidate, and thus 
are able to convey only one single piece of information about their preferences over all the can-
didates contesting that election. What tactical voters may therefore be doing is casting their vote 
in such a way as to convey what they believe to be the single most important bit of information 
about their preferences. A tactical vote, then, is not based upon the voters’ sense that if they want 
to have a chance of being pivotal they should vote for their second-preferred candidate. It may 
simply reflect a decision that the one single piece of information they want to report about their 
preferences is not their favorite candidate, but which one of the two leading candidates they fa-
vor. This view of tactical voting can be consistent with the ‘declining rate’ pattern observed in 
our study.  It requires only that the lower the level of support that there is for a minor candidate, 
the more likely his or her supporters are to conclude that it is better to use their single vote to 
convey information about which of the major candidates they like or dislike.  Seen in this way, 
tactical voting might be particularly attractive to voters who strongly disapprove of one of the 
major candidates. The ballot does not allow them to directly cast a negative vote, but they can 
register their disapproval indirectly by voting for that candidates’ most serious opponent  instead 
of for their favorite (but minor) candidate.  A tactical vote can thus serve as a means of casting a 
negative vote on a ballot that does not permit negative votes. In our view, this alternative expla-
nation for tactical voting is much more congenial to rational choice theory than is the conven-
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tional account, which holds that voters operate under the grand illusion that they might be pivot-
al. 
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APPENDIX 
This survey was implemented by Interviewing Services of America (ISA), using list-assisted 
random digit dialing (RDD) survey methodologies and trained interviewers. A Spanish-language 
version of the questionnaire was available, and nine respondents were interviewed in Spanish.  
The sample is comprised of 1500 California adults who reported that they were registered 
to vote. To obtain the 1500 completed interviews, ISA utilized a list of 20,765 California resi-
dential telephone numbers. Using the standard American Association for Public Opinion Re-
search (AAPOR) guidelines, the cooperation rate for eligible respondents, i.e., those who re-
ported they were registered, was 54.5 per cent, which is high by contemporary standards. The 
two standard response rate estimates for RDD telephone surveys, RR1 and RR2, were 9.8 per 
cent and 10.5 per cent, respectively. These low response rates can be attributed to several 
sources, the largest being the 7443 telephone numbers that were never resolved, either because 
no one ever answered despite repeated callbacks (4976), because the number was sampled but 
never dialed (2058), or for other reasons. Removing these 7443 numbers of unknown eligibility 
from the computation produces response rates of 19.3 per cent and 20.5 per cent for RR1 and 
RR2, respectively. Another 5540 numbers were ineligible because they had been disconnected 
(2924), were business numbers (978), or faxes and modems (959). There were also 4835 unsuc-
cessful contact attempts, which includes calls picked up by answering machines (2665), or at-
tempts by the interviewers to call back later but which never yielded an interview (2170).     
Table A1 lists responses to the vote questions and some key demographic characteristics 
from our survey (the first column), and compares these figures to those obtained from the final 
Los Angeles Times pre-election poll, the Los Angeles Times Exit Poll conducted on election day, 
and the official returns reported by the California Secretary of State. The Times pre-election poll 
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contains a large over-sample of Latino and other minority group respondents, but the entries re-
ported in the rest of the cells are based upon a re-weighted sample intended to reflect major de-
mographic characteristics of the California electorate. The Times Exit Poll data were weighted to 
match the official returns. 
[Table A1 about here] 
Respondents in our survey registered a slightly higher ‘yes’ vote on the recall than did 
respondents in the other polls and, as shown in the official returns column, than what turned out 
to be the case. Our survey and the Times pre-election phone poll also under-estimated Schwarze-
negger’s vote share and over-estimated McClintock’s, but again, not by very much. The large 
over-sample of Latinos and other minorities in the Times phone poll means that its race and eth-
nicity figures are not comparable to ours. Compared to the Times exit poll, however, our sample 
contained a larger percentage of Latinos and a smaller percentage of whites. The educational at-
tainment of respondents in our survey was also somewhat less than of respondents in the two Los 
Angeles Times polls, and a slightly smaller percentage of respondents indicated that they or 
someone else in their household belonged to a labor union. In general, then, the discrepancies 
between our survey, the Los Angeles Times polls, and the official returns are minor. It thus ap-
pears that respondents in our survey were statistically a good representative sample of the Cali-
fornia electorate in October 2003. 
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TABLE 1  Preference Orderings over Candidates in the  California Recall Election 
 
Type of Preference Ordering 
 
Percent 
Transitive and complete 50.7 
(761) 
Transitive, one indifference 27.0 
(405) 
Transitive, two indifferences  1.5 
(23) 
Transitive over three candidates 5.5 
(82) 
Only top choice identified 6.9 
(103) 
Intransitive 3.3 
(49) 
No Candidates Ranked 5.1 
(77) 
Note: The number of observations in each category is reported in parentheses below each percen-
tage entry. 
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TABLE 2 Most Preferred Candidate and Vote Shares in the Replacement Election 
(in  per cent)  
 Most Preferred Candidate Vote Share 
Schwarzenegger 34.2 45.6 
Bustamante 10.3 32.8 
McClintock 21.9 15.6 
Camejo   5.8   3.7 
All Others   4.4   2.2 
Davis 23.8 ------ 
N 1346 1202 
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TABLE 3 Tactical Voting in the Replacement Election 
 Vote Choice (in per cent) 
Most Preferred  
Candidate 
Schwarzenegger Bustamante McClintock Camejo      Other N 
Schwarzenegger 97.4 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.2 417 
Bustamante 1.8 97.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 113 
McClintock 37.0 1.2 61.8 0.0    0.0 238 
Camejo 10.1 36.2 5.8 44.9 2.9   69 
Other 12.2 42.9 8.2 4.1 32.7   49 
Davis 4.5 83.3 6.1 4.5 1.6 245 
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TABLE 4 Voting Decisions of McClintock Supporters (in per cent) 
Vote Choice Candidate Ranked Second 
 Schwarzenegger Bustamante Davis No Second 
Choice 
McClintock 52.3 85.7 86.2 92.3 
Schwarzenegger 47.7 4.8 10.3 7.7 
Bustamante 0.0 9.5 3.5 0.0 
N 174 21 29 13 
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TABLE 5 Support for the Recall of Gray Davis: Simple Hedge Voting  (Per cent Vot-
ing Yes) 
 Ranking of Davis 
Most Preferred 
Candidate 
Second Third* Last Total 
Schwarzenegger 81.8 
 (22) 
92.0 
(125) 
94.0  
(283) 
92.8  
(430) 
McClintock 27.3 
 (33) 
86.7 
(165) 
92.3 
 (65) 
79.7 
(263) 
Bustamante 25.3 
 (75) 
50.0 
 (26) 
75.0 
 (16) 
37.9 
(117) 
Camejo   5.6 
  (36) 
27.8 
 (36) 
100.0 
  (2) 
18.9 
 (74) 
Others 14.3 
 (21) 
28.6 
 (14) 
100.0 
  (12) 
40.4 
 (47) 
Davis ___ ___ ___ 
 
  6.9 
 (290) 
Note: The number of observations in each category is reported in parentheses below each percen-
tage entry. 
*Asterisk indicates respondents who are coded as ranking Davis third also ranked another candi-
date below him. A small number of respondents ranked Davis third, but only revealed a prefe-
rence ordering over three candidates (see Table 1). In these cases they were classified as having 
ranked Davis last. Those who were indifferent between Davis and another candidate but ranked 
the pair of them last were also deemed to have ranked Davis last.    
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TABLE 6 Conditional Hedge Voting 
Favorite Candidate 
 Schwarzenegger McClintock Bustamante 
Major Opponent’s 
Chances 
Percent Recall Vote Percent Recall Vote Percent Recall Vote 
Very Unlikely 37.5 92.3 18.9 57.1 21.2 31.8 
Somewhat Unlikely 30.8 75.0 42.3 78.7 18.4 12.5 
Somewhat Likely 26.9 92.9 29.7 48.5 42.7 26.2 
Very Likely  4.8 --*  9.0 80.0 17.8 38.4 
N 104 -- 111 -- 101 -- 
* = insufficient n 
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TABLE 7 Logit Analysis of Simple vs. Conditional Hedge Voting 
 Voter’s Most Preferred Candidate 
Variable Schwarzenegger McClintock Bustamante 
C   2.31 -1.02   -2.27 
    (.77)   (.66)     (.76) 
    
Davis third    .88  2.57*    1.64* 
    (.66)   (.53)      (.64) 
    
Davis last    .95  3.09*    2.61* 
    (.63)   (.75)      (.85) 
    
Main opponent’s   -.20  -.17     .19 
Chances    (.22)   (.17)     (.22) 
    
Strong ideologue     .15 2.10*   -1.89 
     (.57)  (.83)    (1.17) 
    
Female  -.88*   .15     .67 
    (.41)   (.39)     (.53) 
    
College educated    .03   .54    -.04 
    (.39)   (.39)     (.49) 
    
Latino   -.10   .10     .89 
    (.58)   (.73)     (.48) 
    
Black    ---** -1.29    -.82 
     (.86)     (.99) 
    
N    424   262   114 
    
Log Likelihood -105.9 -94.2 -61.9 
Note: The numbers in parentheses below each coefficient are standard errors. 
  * = p < .05    
** = insufficient n    
 
 45 
 
 
TABLE A1 Comparison of Sample Surveys and Official Returns 
          Recall Survey 
(Sept. 23-Oct. 
2) 
LA Times Poll* 
(Sept. 25-9) 
LA Times Exit 
Poll** (Oct. 3) 
Official  
Returns   
(Sec. of  State) 
Yes on Recall 57.4 56.0 55.5 55.4 
Schwarzenegger 44.8 44.4 49.0 48.6 
Bustamante 32.3 35.6 32.0 31.5 
McClintock 15.4 16.7 13.0 13.5 
White  62.9 51.7 73.0 ___ 
Latino  15.3 27.8 11.0 ___ 
Asian  6.1 11.2 6.0 ___ 
Black  4.4  6.3 5.0 ___ 
Union Household 26.5 27.8 30.0 ___ 
High School Grad 
or Less 
20.9 19.8 15.0 ____ 
Some College 28.9 32.4 26.0 ____ 
College Grad or 
More 
50.3 47.7 59.0 ____ 
* This poll contained a large over-sample of minority respondents. Entries in this column other 
than those for race and ethnicity are based on observations that were weighted so as to approx-
imate actual population characteristics. 
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